Panel discussion - Global Impunity
 Experiences and Strategies in Seeking Justice for the Murder of Journalists
21 February, 2006
Carlos Cortés Castillo - Executive Director, Foundation for the Freedom of the Press
On behalf of the Foundation for the Freedom of the Press of Colombia, FLIP, I want to thank IFEX and the Clearing House for this invitation, and IFJ for hosting us in this beautiful city.
Since 1996, FLIP is devoted to promote the exercise of the press freedom in Colombia as means to guarantee the right to information of the whole society. FLIP systematically monitors the press freedom situation throughout the country and develops activities that contribute to the protection of the life and integrity of reporters.
Discussions regarding impunity in Latin America never seem to end. But as well, impunity itself doesn't end or decrease. My colleagues of Latin America must agree when I say impunity regarding violations of the freedom of the press is on of the most serious problems our countries face.
If at this point I have to summarize what I'm about to talk, I would just say: impunity is bad in Colombia, and it will probably get worse.
Before I start with the bad scenario, let me give you a very brief context. For fifty years, Colombia, with a population of approximately 40 million, has faced an armed conflict with devastating consequences for our people. On one hand we have the guerrilla - FARC and ELN -. Originally it was a leftish irregular armed force fighting against the establishment. Now they control vast regions, financed with the extortive kidnapping business and the administration of cocaine paste fields.
On the other hand, we have the paramilitary forces, originally conceived as private security groups to fight the guerrilla. These groups have now disseminated into several little armies with a pretty wide agenda: drugdealing, illegal gasoline commerce, control of betting business in the regions and violent protection of landlords. In much of their activities they have massacred civilians suspicious of sympathizing with the guerrilla, in some cases with the tacit or explicit approval of the Army.
With this context in mind, let's move on to the bad scenario: on 2004, FLIP monitored the status of 157 criminal investigations filed on 2002, regarding aggressions against journalists: I don't want to overwhelm you with this numbers. I'll give just a couple: from the 157 cases only two went to trial. The remaining ones ended on the prosecution stage. This represents 1.27% of the cases. Of those two, only one has a conviction sentence: I'm talking about journalist Orlando Sierra, sub director of La Patria newspaper, from Manizales, department of Caldas, shot on January 30, 2002, and dead two days after. Only the gunmen were convicted. Nonetheless, there is clear-cut evidence of the masterminds' identities.
The first conclusion of this undeniable impunity is the deficient justice administration system of Colombia, influenced by illegal interests and unwillingness of the governments.
FLIP has been reiterative to the government, who administrates the protection program for journalists, and with the major foreign agencies that support it: we can't continue putting out fires, running around when a journalist gets shot or threatened, determining how many journalists need bulletproof vests, bodyguards or trucks. We need a real public policy of prevention, which includes an efficient justice system. We need to put a very high price to pay for aggressions to the freedom of the press.
But while we are in the middle of these statements trying to put some pressure on the government, another scenario shows up:
Since 2002, when he won the presidential elections, Álvaro Uribe has carried out a peace process with paramilitary forces (the disseminated groups of private armies I mentioned at the beginning). Before Uribe, former president Andrés Pastrana tried himself a peace process with the opposite side, the guerrilla of FARC. At the end, it was a tremendous failure. The peace process ended abruptly after FARC kidnapped an airplane in the middle of a flight, landed it on a road in Caquetá region and took several hostages. This background was the perfect picture for Uribe's campaign.
During almost three years the process was held under unknown premises of negotiation. Some people asked themselves what was to negotiate with a bunch of brutal bodyguards on the loose. But Uribe took advantage of his very favorable surveys. As of 2003, the first groups started to demobilize and gave some of their weapons. No records were made on the lands they illegally had, the forced displacements they had caused and the massacres they made.
Although paramilitaries committed to a 'cease fire' or truce, the regions where these groups have been talking to the government and demobilizing correspond to the ones with more aggressions against journalists. These groups have imposed a fear method that has self censored journalists. Furthermore, in the upcoming elections paramilitaries have their own candidates for the congress. In this sense, they expect - or other wise 'kindly' suggest - the best media coverage for their politicians.
The results of the peace process, still in progress, were supported by a bill approved by the congress, so called Justice and Peace Law. This law doesn't comply with the international standards for peace process, known as transitional justice processes. The minimum international standards of truth, justice and reparation are set aside. Paramilitaries, responsible for crimes against human rights and serious aggressions, injuries and attacks against journalist have in the umbrella of this law the perfect shadow for impunity.
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